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NOT YOUR GARDEN VARIETY TORT REFORM:
STATUTES BARRING CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL LIFE
AND WRONGFUL BIRTH ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE PURPOSE PRONG OF PLANNED
PARENTHOOD v. CASEY
INTRODUCTION
At the age of 36, Julie Sejpal gave birth to a daughter with
Down syndrome.' Ms. Sejpal, a teacher of differently-abled
children, had expressed concern throughout her pregnancy that
she was at increased risk for fetal anomalies because of her
age. Still her obstetricians discouraged her from getting amnio-
centesis,2 assuring her that the test would not be necessary
unless other prenatal tests suggested a problem.3 Two months
later, a routine prenatal blood test showed that Ms. Sejpal
faced a greater than normal risk of giving birth to a child with
Down syndrome.4 The laboratory result specifically warned
that the patient should be advised about the availability of
amniocentesis and genetic counseling.'
Ms. Sejpal's physicians never advised her about the avail-
ability of amniocentesis, nor did they refer her for genetic
counseling.6 In fact, when a sonogram indicated that her preg-
nancy was not progressing normally, one of her obstetricians
I Complaint at I9 11, 27, Sejpal v. Corson, No. 1991-2288.A (Pa. Ct. Comm.
P1. Mar. 4, 1992), affd, 627 A.2d 210 (Pa. Super. Ct 1993) [hereinafter Seipal
Complaint].
2 See F. GARY CUNNINGHAM, M.D. ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTTETRICS 945-48 (19th
ed. 1993).
' See Petitioners' Appendix to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 87a-S9a,
Sejpal v. Corson, 637 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 30 (1994) [here-
inafter Sejpal Cert. Appendix] (excerpting deposition of Julie Sejpal).
' Sejpal Complaint, supra note 1, at q 12; Sejpal Cert. Appendix, cupra note
3, at 83a.
r Sejpal Complaint, supra note 1, at q 12; Sejpal Cert. Appendix, supra note
3, at 83a.
' Sejpal Complaint, supra note 1, at 1 18; Sejpal Cert. Appendix, cupra note
3, at 88a-89a.
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misinformed her that the fetus's small size suggested only that
her pregnancy was less advanced than he had thought.' When
Ms. Sejpal asked if the blood test should be repeated, he told
her it was unnecessary.8
On August 30, 1989, Erica Sejpal was delivered by Cesare-
an section.9 Julie Sejpal saw Erica only briefly before a nurse
whisked the baby off under the pretext that Erica needed oxy-
gen.' ° The medical personnel told both Julie Sejpal and her
husband that Erica was fine; no one alerted them to Erica's
condition." The obstetrician then proceeded to sterilize Ms.
Sejpal by tubal ligation, a procedure to which Ms. Sejpal had
consented the week before. 2 Ms. Sejpal did not find out until
hours after Erica's delivery and the sterilization that her baby
had been born with Down syndrome.
Julie Sejpal and her husband sued her physicians and the
hospital for wrongful birth. 3 They also sued on behalf of
Erica for wrongful life. 4 The Sejpals alleged that Ms. Sejpal
would have had the information necessary to decide whether to
terminate her pregnancy but for the physicians' and hospital's
acts. 5 They further asserted that if Ms. Sejpal had known of
her fetus' condition, she would have sought an abortion and
would not have consented to being sterilized. 6
The Sejpals filed suit in Pennsylvania state court. Unfortu-
nately for the Sejpals, Pennsylvania bars wrongful life and
birth claims by statute. 7 Accordingly, the physicians and the
hospital sought to dismiss these claims.' In response to the
Sejpal Cert. Appendix, supra note 3, at 87a, 90a.
Sejpal Cert. Appendix, supra note 3, at 90a.
Sejpal Complaint, supra note 1, at 25.
10 Sejpal Cert. Appendix, supra note 3, at 91a-92a.
n Id.
12 Sejpal Complaint, supra note 1, at q 26; Sejpal Cert. Appendix, supra note
3, at 92a.
1 Sejpal Complaint, supra note 1, Counts Il, VI, XV, XVIHI.
" Sejpal Complaint, supra note 1, Count XX. The Sejpals also sued for medi-
cal malpractice, hospital malpractice, unfair trade practices, and fraudulent misrep-
resentation.
Sejpal Complaint, supra note 1, at % 40-41.
16 Sejpal Complaint, supra note 1, at % 36-37, 40-41; Sejpal Cert. Appendix,
supra note 3, at 89a, 90a.
17 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a), (b) (Supp. 1993).
18 Defendants' Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs' Complaint at 99 3.11, Sejpal
v. Corson, No. 1991-2288-A (Pa. Ct. Comm. P1. Mar. 4, 1992), affd, 627 A.2d 210
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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motion, the Sejpals asserted that the statutes violated their
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy, which encompassed
Julie Sejpal's right to choose abortion as established in Roe v.
Wade. " The Court of Common Pleas rejected this assertion,
finding that the statutes did not infringe on any Fourteenth
Amendment rights, and dismissed the claims for wrongful life
and wrongful birth.0
Whether and to what degree the Fourteenth Amendment
prevents a state from restricting the right to choose abortion
would soon become an issue of national debate. One month
after the Court of Common Pleas' decision, in April 1992, a
nation in the midst of this divisive and vitriolic debate listened
anxiously to the most passionate argument before the United
States Supreme Court since Brown v. Board of Education.2'
Two months later, the Court released its now landmark deci-
sion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey [hereinafter Planned Parenthood v. Casey], ' in which a
plurality affirmed the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade while
upholding considerable restrictions on a woman s right to ter-
minate her pregnancy.' Most significantly, the Casey plural-
ity altered abortion jurisprudence radically with its ruling that
restrictions on a woman's right to choose abortion were no
longer subject to strict scrutiny,24 but instead to a newly-
v 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For discussion of the development of the right to priva-
cy, see infra part I-A.
I Sejpal v. Corson, No. 1991-2288-A (Pa. Ct. Comm. PL Mar. 4, 1992), affd,
627 A.2d 210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
21 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court itself compared the magnitude of the deci-
sion facing it to that of the Warren Court in Brown. Justice Souter wrote, "[the
Court is not asked to [settle a national controversy] very often, having thus ad-
dressed the Nation only twice in our lifetime, in the decisions of Brown and Roe."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2815 (1992). Although the country
was not focused on reproductive rights issues when Roe legalized abortion, the
decision sparked the formation of the anti-choice movement. For a discussion of
the intensity of this debate, see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE
CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 237-42 (1990) (noting that opposing sides of the abortion
debate tend to view each other as incapable of feeling and void of rational
thought). See also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 4 (1993) (comparing the
abortion debate to the "terrible seventeenth-century European civil wars of reli-
gion" complete with "[o]pposing armies march[ing] down streets or pack[ing] them-
selves into protests at abortion clinics, courthouses, and the White House, scream-
ing at and spitting on and loathing one another").
2 112 S. Ct. at 2791.
2 Id.
I' See infra notes 31-45 for discussion of strict scrutiny analysis and its rela-
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minted and less stringent "undue burden" standard of re-
viewY
At the same time as the Casey plurality lowered the con-
stitutional standard of review for laws that affect the right to
choose abortion, Casey expanded the scope of legislation that
would be subject to that review. The joint opinion defined an
undue burden as "a state regulation [that] has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." This disjunctive
language---"purpose or effect"--provides two alternative and
independent bases for review of legislation affecting reproduc-
tive choice. Prior to Casey, purpose was not an independent
inquiry. After Casey, legislation affecting abortion rights is
unconstitutional if it is passed with either the purpose of sub-
stantially obstructing women seeking abortions or when the
legislation has that effect.
Statutes that bar wrongful life and wrongful birth claims
are passed with precisely the purpose that Casey proscribes.
The express purpose of these statutes is to remove physicians'
liability for these birth-related torts. On its face, this legisla-
tion appears to be standard tort reform. The legislative history
of Pennsylvania's wrongful life and birth statutes,' however,
illustrates that the Pennsylvania legislature's actual reason for
banning wrongful life and birth actions was not tort reform,
but to deter women from having abortions. The legislature
tionship to abortion rights.
2 112 S. Ct. at 2819-20. Although the undue burden standard had arisen in
prior cases, see ,e.g., Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
462 (1983) (Akron 1) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that restriction which does
not unduly burden a woman's ability to obtain an abortion should be subject to
rational basis review), the Casey plurality explicitly stated that previous articula-
tions of the standard "could be considered inconsistent" and therefore, to clarify
any confusion, clearly defined the standard. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
For other previous incarnations of the undue burden standard, see Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 459 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment) (citing Akron 1). See also Webster v. Reproductive Health Serve.,
492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg.
ment in part) (finding that requirement of fetal viability tests "does not impose an
undue burden on a woman's abortion decision"); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 497 U.S. 502, 519-20 (1990) (Akron I1) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (hold-
ing that parental notification statute "does not impose an undue, or otherwise un-
constitutional, burden on a minor seeking an abortion.").
2" 112 S. Ct. at 2820 (emphasis added).
27 These are the statutes that barred the Sejpals' claims.
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intended to accomplish this purpose by encouraging physicians
to withhold information from women about the health of their
fetuses-information that might lead women to seek abortions.
This legislative purpose-to prevent a woman from making an
informed choice about whether to terminate her pregnancy-is
proscribed by the purpose prong of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.
This Note argues that under the effect prong of Casey,
statutes that bar wrongful life and wrongful birth claims have
an indirect but impermissible effect on a woman's right to
choose abortion. That effect may be difficult to prove, however,
under the effect prong analysis that Casey requires. These
statutes' impermissible legislative purpose, however, is emi-
nently clear.
Part I of this Note briefly examines the history of abortion
jurisprudence from Roe v. Wade to the Casey decision, and
discusses how Casey's departures from the reasoning of Roe
have altered federal protection of the right to abortion dramat-
ically. Part II surveys the history of wrongful life and wrongful
birth claims and the statutes barring them. Part HI applies
Casey's undue burden standard, both effect and purpose, to
wrongful life and wrongful birth statutes. This Part argues
that although these statutes have the impermissible effect of
unduly burdening women's right to liberty, litigants face al-
most insurmountable difficulties in proving such effect. Next,
this section asserts that the Pennsylvania state legislature's
purpose for passing wrongful life and birth statutes is not tort
reform, but to prevent women from choosing abortion. This
impermissible legislative purpose constitutes an undue burden
on the right to choose abortion, and as a result, statutes bar-
ring wrongful life and wrongful birth actions are unconstitu-
tional under the purpose prong of Casey. Part IV concludes
that the purpose prong is an essential legal construct for pro-
tecting and preserving abortion rights.
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I. ABORTION RIGHTS SINCE ROE V. WADE
A. Abortion as a Facet of the Fundamental Right to Privacy
The fundamental right to privacy, a penumbral right de-
scribed by Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut,' is
essentially "the right to be let alone." Justice Douglas found
"emanations" giving rise to a "zone of privacy" in the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.0 Protections of
fundamental rights provided by these amendments'apply to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 Justice Douglas asserted that the right to pri-
vacy, particularly marital privacy, predated the Bill of
Rights; 2 therefore, he argued, the Bill of Rights does not be-
stow new rights, but merely recognizes inherent rights enjoyed
by all people.33 These fundamental rights embodied in the Bill
of Rights are particularly sacrosanct, and the state must meet
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Justice Douglas argued that "specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance." Id. at 484 (Griswold held that the right
to privacy encompassed married couples' right to access of contraceptives). Id. at
485-86. In 1972, Eisenstadt v. Baird extended the right to privacy to individuals.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
2' 381 U.S. at 483-85.
" The Due Process clause provides in pertinent part, "[n]o state shall make or
enforce any law which will abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.. . . " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, the Supreme Court listed several rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights that
apply to the states through the Due Process Clause, including: the right guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendment to compensation for property taken by the State;
the rights of speech, press, and religion covered by the First Amendment; the
Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and
to have any evidence illegally seized excluded from criminal trials; the right guar-
anteed by the Fifth Amendment to be free from compelled self-incrimination; and
the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to confronta-
tion of opposing witnesses, and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. 391
U.S. 145 (1968). See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (noting that "the right to
educate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to the States by the force
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments" and that "the same dignity is given the
right to study the German language in a private school") (citations omitted).
' Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
33 Id.
[Vol. 61:235
WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL BIRTH STATUTES
a high standard to justify an infringement on them. This
stringent standard seeks to minimize state infringements on
fundamental rights by demanding that legislation serve a
compelling state interest and that it be narrowly tailored to
accomplish that objective."
The Supreme Court first determined that the fundamental
right to privacy encompassed the right to abortion in Roe v.
Wade.s Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun delineat-
ed the various interests at stake in the abortion context: the
woman's right to privacy, the health of the woman, and the
state's interest in fetal life.' In Roe, the Court balanced these
interests within the framework of the "trimester system" that
obstetricians use to chart a woman s pregnancy.s Applying
strict scrutiny, the Court found that although the state's inter-
ests in the health of the mother and the life of the fetus are
"legitimate" throughout a woman's pregnancy," not until the
third trimester does the state's interest in fetal life become
compelling."' At this point in a woman's pregnancy, the state
can prohibit abortion except when necessary to save the life or
preserve the health of the woman.4' Because the state lacks a
compelling interest in the fetus in the first and second trimes-
ters of pregnancy, the Court held that bans on abortions per-
formed during this period violate a woman's fundamental right
' See Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (listing fundamental rights).
' Id. at 155-56 (describing strict scrutiny).
"This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.! Id. at 153. This formulation has been
questioned from its inception. In his dissenting opinion, then-Jusica Rehnquist
disagreed that any right to privacy was at issue in Roe. Id. at 172 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist further objected that the right to abortion vas com-
pletely unknown to the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, was
not protected by it. Id. at 174.
Feminists have also criticized the establishment of the right to abortion under
the rubric of the right to privacy. Many of these critics assert that the right to
abortion more aptly fits within equal protection jurisprudence. Sce, e.g., Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and tiw Consti-
tution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
' See Roe, 410 U.S. at 150-55.
Id. at 162-64.
Id. at 150-51.
According to Justice Blackmun, viability, the point at which the state's inter-
est becomes compelling, occurs at approximately 24 weeks. Id. at 160, 163.
' Id at 163-64.
1995]
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to privacy and therefore are unconstitutional.42
For a short period after Roe, women enjoyed virtually
unfettered access to abortion services. Gradually, however,
Congress and state legislatures enacted and the Supreme
Court upheld a range of measures designed to restrict abortion
access. As early as 1976, Congress passed the first Hyde
Amendment, which limited Medicaid funding of abortion to
those abortions necessary to save the pregnant woman's life.43
In 1980, the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to
the Hyde Amendment." The Court reasoned that although
the state may not actively impede a woman's access to first or
2 Id. at 164.
" Subchapter XIX of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1396) (1976)) established Medicaid, which provides health insurance
for the poor. Every year since 1976, Congress has continued to prohibit funding of
abortion either by amendment to its annual appropriations bill for the Depart-
ments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education or by joint resolution.
The most restrictive version of the Hyde Amendment, in effect from 1980 to 1993,
funded abortion only when necessary to save the life of the woman. See, e.g.,
Depts. of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-394, § 203, 106 Stat. 1792, 1811
(1992).
In 1977 and 1978, Congress loosened the restrictions slightly to allow funding
for abortion if the pregnancy posed a serious health risk to the woman. See Pub.
L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460, (1977); Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat.
1586, (1978). The appropriations bill for 1994 funds abortion both to save the life
of the woman and if the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. Depts. of Labor,
Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-112, § 509, 107 Stat. 1113, (1993). Prior amendments
with an exception for rape or incest required that the rape or incest be reported
to a law enforcement agency or public health service. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-123,
§ 109, 93 Stat. 926, (1979) (providing exception for "medical procedures necessary
for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported
promptly").
The American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs noted that if
restrictive funding regulations deter women from seeking early termination of
pregnancy, "there is likely to be a small but measurable increase in mortality and
morbidity among women in the United States". COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS,
AMIERICAN MEDICAL AsSOC., Induced Termination of Pregnancy Before and After
Roe v. Wade: Trends in the Mortality and Morbidity of Women, 268 JAMA 3231,
3238 (1992). [hereinafter Trends]. For a thorough report on the impact of abortion
on women's health since 1973, see Trends, supra.
" Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). For a critical view of the often devas-
tating effects that the Hyde Amendment wreaks on poor women's reproductive
health and choice, and an argument that those effects violate equal protection
guarantees, see Julie F. Kay, Note, If Men Could Get Pregnant: An Equal Protec-
tion Model for Federal Funding of Abortion Under a National Health Care Plan,
60 BROOF L. REv. 349 (1994).
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second trimester abortions, it has no obligation to remove ob-
stacles to access, such as poverty, that are not of its own cre-
ation.4 Then, in 1991, the Court upheld a "gag rule" that
banned the expenditure of federal funds to family planning
clinics providing abortion counseling or referral.46 The Court
implied that the state interest in encouraging childbirth out-
weighed a physician's right to free speech by holding that the
ban did not implicate the First Amendment.47
Throughout this period, in addition to federal restrictions,
the Court validated a range of state restrictions requiring
parental notification48 or consent, 9 tests to determine fetal
viability," informed consent provisions,' and mandatory de-
Harris, 448 U.S. at 316.
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). In 1970, Congress enacted Title X of
the Public Health Service Act to provide for federal funding of family planning
clinics. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (date & Supp. 1985). Congress denied funds to
"programs where abortion is a method of family planning." 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6.
The "gag rule" was a set of regulations promulgated by the Department of Health
and Human Services under the Reagan and Bush Administrations that attached
several additional conditions to the receipt of federal funds. In addition to prevent-
ing any abortion counseling, 42 C.F.R. 59.8(a)(1) (1988), or referrals, 42 C.F.
59.8(b)(5), the regulations also required that facilities which provided both family
planning services and abortion services have physically separate areas where the
services were provided, 42 CFI.R 59.9, and that they have separate entrances. Id.
See also 500 U.S. at 178-81. These regulations further required that these facilities
maintain complete financial separation between abortion and family planning ser-
vices and that they keep detailed accounting of that separation. 42 C.F.R. 59.9
(1989); see also 500 U.S. at 180-81.
The gag rule was opposed adamantly by pro-choice advocates as well as the
medical establishment. See Spencer Rich, Medical Groups Ash End to Abortion
"Gag Rule,- WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1992, at A5. Congress also disliked the gag
rule, and voted to lift the restrictions that it imposed, but only the Senate could
muster the votes to override President Bush's veto. See Major Garrett, House Votes
to Lift Abortion "Gag Rule," WASH. TIMES, June 27, 1991, at Al; cce also Joyce
Price, Senate Votes to Ouerride Abortion Counseling Veto, WASH. TIMES, Oct 2,
1992, at A3. President Clinton, honoring an early and unequivocal campaign prom-
ise, repealed the gag rule during his first days in office. See Ann Davroy, Clinton
Cancels Abortion Restrictions of Reagan-Bush Era; 'Gag Rule" on Clinics, Federal
Ban On Fetal Tissue Research Are Lifted, WASIL POST, Jan. 23, 1993 at Al.
Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-200.
sHL. v. Mlathieson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding provision requiring physi-
cians to notify parents of a minor who wished to obtain an abortion).
"Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662 (1979) (Bellotti 1) (parental consent constitu-
tional with judicial bypass).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 US. 490 (1989). In Webster, the
plurality found that the state had a compelling interest in preventing a viable
fetus from being aborted, regardless of whether viability tests themselves were
necessary or might be harmful to the pregnant women. The plurality asserted that
19951
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lay periods. 2 Additionally, in the early 1990's, the respective
legislatures of Louisiana,53 Utah,' and the Territory of
Guam55 passed bans on abortion that abortion rights groups
swiftly challenged in lower state and federal courts."
B. The Impact of Planned Parenthood v. Casey
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Planned
Parenthood many believed the Court was poised to overrule
Roe and retract federal protection of the right to abortion en-
tirely." Whether the right to privacy encompassed the right
to be constitutional, abortion restrictions need only "permissibly further[ ] the
State's interest in protecting potential human life." Id. at 519-20. The dissenters
reviled the plurality for formulating a level of scrutiny that was both "circular and
totally meaningless" and "nothing more than a dressed-up version of rational-basis
review, [the) Court's most lenient level of scrutiny." Id. at 554-55 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
Furthermore, the dissenters expressed dismay at the plurality's "implicit invi-
tation to every State to enact more and more restrictive abortion laws." Id. at 556.
The invitation was certainly accepted. After the Webster decision, federal and state
legislators introduced over 600 bills designed to restrict abortion and birth control.
Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v Casey: The Impact of the New Undue Bur-
den Standard on Reproductive Health Care, 269 JAMA 2249, 2250 (May 5, 1993).
See also The Status of a Woman's Right to Choose Abortion, REPRODUCTIVE FREE-
DOM IN THE STATES (Center for Reproductive Law & Policy, Now York, N.Y.), July
20, 1994 (summarizing state abortion restrictions including the District of Colum-
bia, Guam and Puerto Rico) [hereinafter REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM]. Restrictions on
abortion cause women to delay the procedure, which can lead to increased compli-
cations, or to seek illegal abortions, which can lead to deadly results. The AMA's
Council on Scientific Affairs concluded in its study of the effects of abortion on
women's health that the negative impact of "[i]ncreasingly restrictive abortion
laws" would "disproportionately affect young, poor, and minority women" and noted
that "[b]ecause poor and low-income women are most likely to have difficulty with
financial arrangements . . . they are more likely to delay ... and are therefore at
greater risk of abortion-related complications or death" See Trends, supra note 43,
at 3238.
r' See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791.
2 Id.
63 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (1991). The statute was held unconstitutional in
Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1414
(1993).
4 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302. (1991). The ban was held unconstitutional in
Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992).
66 GUAM CODE ANN. § 31.20. (1990). The statute was struck down in Guam
Soc'y of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992).
See supra notes 54-56 and authorities cited therein.
v So many, in fact, that 500,000 people marched in Washington, D.C. to pub-
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to abortion had stirred such controversy that the issue became
a virtual litmus test of nominees to the federal judiciary, in-
cluding the Supreme Court.s Despite dire predictions to the
contrary, however, a plurality of the Court surprised the na-
tion (and the Casey dissenters) by affirming what it called the
"essential holding" of Roe. 9 The Casey plurality maintained
licly express their concern. See Karen De WVittug, Crowd Bachs Right to Abortion
in Capital March, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 1992, at AL Abortion supporters on the
Court were worried as well. Justice Blaclkun warned in his Webster dissent that
"'not with a bang, but a whimper', the plurality ... [had] castD into darkness the
hopes and visions of every woman in this country who had come to believe that
the Constitution guaranteed her the right to exercise some control over her unique
ability to bear children," 492 U.S. at 557, and that while women still had the "lib-
erty to control their destinies ... the signs are evident and very ominous, and a
chill wind blows." Id. at 560.
' The change in personnel on the Supreme Court and lower federal courts was
dramatic in the ten years before Casey. Between 1981 and 1991, Presidents Rea-
gan and Bush nominated five Supreme Court Justices: Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter and Thomas. 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Stephen Nelson et al.
eds., 1993). Justice Powell's resignation and the subsequent nomination of Judge
Robert Bork of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to replace him
set off a maelstrom of debate. This debate culminnted in the Senate Judiciary
Committee's nomination hearings in September 1987, which largely focused on
Judge Bork's strict, textual interpretation of the Constitution, and whether that
interpretation encompassed a right to abortion. After 12 days of debate, the Com-
mittee voted 9-5 to recommend that Judge Bork be rejected; the full Senate re-
jected Borks nomination 58-42. See Linda Greenhouse, Borh's Nomination Ia Re-
jected, 58-42; Reagan 'Saddened,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1987, at 1.
Following the rejection of Bork's nomination, President Reagan considered
nominating Judge Douglas Ginsburg, who was forced to withdraw because he ad-
mitted to having smoked marijuana. See Steven V. Roberts, Ginsburg Withdraw3
Name as Supreme Court Nominee, Citing Marijuana 'Clamor', N.Y. TIES, Nov. 8,
1987, at §1, 1. President Reagan then nominated now Justice Kennedy, whom the
Senate confirmed in February 1988. Even after Casey, abortion remains an issue
in judicial appointments, a fact Justice Blackmun predicted in Cascy itself when
he commented that "when I do step down, the confirmation process for my succes-
sor well may focus on the issue before us today." 112 S. Ct. at 285455.
' 112 S. Ct. at 2804. See also David J. Garrow, Justice Souter Emerges, N.Y.
TImEs, Sept. 25, 1994, § 6 (lagazine), at 36, 38 (noting that when the plurality
circulated its joint opinion to the other Justices, 'Rehnquist and Scalia were
stunned. So, too, was Blackmun?) (quoting David Savage, The Rescue of Roe v.
Wade, L.L TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at Al). Justice Scalia' opinion lambasted the
plurality for its."outrageous arguments" which he found "beyond human nature to
leave unanswered." 112 S. Ct. at 2875. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgmont in
part and dissenting in part). He viewed the joint opinion's reliance on stare decisis
as "contrived," id. at 2881, and the grevised version" of Roe "fabricated." lrL at
2876. Justice Rehnquist's opinion accused the plurality of hypocrisy. '"e end
result of the joint opinion's paeans of praise for legitimacy is the enunciation of a
brand new standard... which is created largely out of whole cloth by the au-
thors of the joint opinion." Id. at 2866. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the
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federal protection of the right to abortion while definitively
expanding the ability of the state to regulate the procedure.
The joint opinion attempted to formulate a compromise that
would placate both sides in the national debate."
undue burden standard espoused in the joint opinion "even today does not com-
mand the support of a majority of this Court.... In sum, it is a standard which
is not built to last." Id. For thorough criticism of the Casey decision, see generally
Elizabeth A. Schneider, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 TEMPLE L. REV.
1003 (1993); see also C. Elaine Howard, Note, The Roe'd to Confusion: Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1457 (1993).
' Casey may have quelled the immediate political furor, but it left the emo-
tions that engendered the public debate about abortion largely unresolved. The
violence directed at abortion clinics and abortion providers, most tragically demon-
strated by the murders of Dr. David Gunn and Dr. John Britton in Pensacola, FL,
and the murders at clinics in Brookline, Massachusetts, and in addition blockades,
property destruction, including arson and chemical attacks, harassment, assault
and kidnapping, is shocking. From 1977 to 1993, abortion clinics were subject to
86 arsons, 37 bombings, and 62 attempts at either. THE CENTER FOR REPRODUC-
TIVE LAW & POLICY, Federal Responses to Anti-Choice Violence and Harassment,
Reproductive Freedom on the Hill (1994) [hereinafter Federal Responses] (citing sta-
tistics compiled by the National Abortion Federation in an October 14, 1993 re-
port). These disturbing statistics provide ample evidence that the issue of abortion
is far from settled.
In response to clinic violence and its resulting intimidation of women seeking
abortions, Congress passed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248) [hereinafter
'FACE"]. FACE prohibits individuals from interfering with another person's access
to reproductive health services, either by intentionally injuring or intimidating that
person by force, threat of force, or physical obstruction, 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1), and
provides both civil and criminal remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 248(b),(c). FACE does not,
however, implicate activities and expression protected by the First Amendment. 18
U.S.C. § 248(d)(1),(2). For a brief history of FACE, see Federal Responses. Enforce-
ment of FACE has proven problematic, with clinic directors asserting that the FBI
neglects to take action when clinics and their staffs are threatened. See Ana Puga,
Groups Decry Attacks on Abortion Providers; Urge US to Step Up Prosecutions,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 1995, at 12; Robert Pear, Abortion Clinic Workers Say
Law Is Being Ignored, N.Y. TIMS, Sept. 23, 1994, at A16.
Pro-life groups have filed facial challenges to FACE's validity in several feder-
al district courts around the country, alleging, inter alia, that FACE chills their
First Amendment and other rights. See, e.g., Terry v. Reno, Civ. Action No. 94-
1154 (D.D.C., filed May 26, 1994); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693 (D.Ariz. 1994);
Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008 (W.D. La. 1994); Council for Life Coalition v.
Rno, 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D.Cal. 1994); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855
F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1994), afftd, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995).
FACE may be ominously linked to abortion violence, as Dr. Britton was mur-
dered by Paul Hill the morning following the Middle District of Florida's rejection
of a challenge to FACE in Cheffer v. Reno, 94-0611-CIV-ORL-18 (M.D. Fl. July 26,
1994). Hill had been a regular protester at the Pensacola clinic and had advocated
on national television and throughout the news media using force to protest abor-
tion. See Robert D. McFadden, Death of a Doctor: The Warnings; News Accounts
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Under Roe, a woman's right to privacy encompassed her
right to terminate her pregnancy.6' Significant aspects of the
joint opinion in Casey, written by Justices Souter, O'Connor
and Kennedy, departed from this position. First, the plurality
refrained the right to abortion as a liberty interest deriving
from the Due Process Clause.' The joint opinion then de-
clined to apply strict scrutiny to a woman s newly defined
liberty interest in abortion, choosing to apply an undue burden
standard instead. Finally, Casey jettisoned the trimester
framework of Roe,s and adopted fetal viability as the point at
Presaged Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at 26. Hill was eventually indicted
and convicted under FACE. See Ronald Smothers, Abortion Protestr Is Guilty
Under Clinic Access Law, N.Y. TES, Oct. 6, 1994, at A18.
61 See 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
Indeed, this reframing is reflected in the opening words of the plurality
opinion: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." 112 S. Ct. at 2803.
The plurality does not ignore the series of privacy cases on which Roe relied, but
it declines to interpret Roe as a privacy case. See supra notes 28.42 and accompa-
nying text for discussion of the privacy decisions. Instead, the plurality states that
"in some critical respects the abortion decision is of the same character as the
decision to use contraception, to which [the privacy cases] afford constitutional
protection," and that those decisions "support the reasoning in Roe relating to the
woman's liberty" 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
Moreover, the plurality infers that the majority in Griswold based its decision
on liberty and not privacy. Justice Douglas's opinion in Gric,,old, however, consis-
tently uses the term "privacy." See, e.g. 381 US. at 484 ("Various guarantees
create zones of privacy."); id. at 485 ("The present case, then, concerns a relation-
ship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees."). In his concurrence, Justice Harlan focused his analyds on liberty.
"Mhe proper constitutional inquiry... is whether this . . . statute infringes the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates
basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 Us.
319, 325 (1937)). Unlike the Casey plurality, which adopted and applied the undue
burden standard to a woman's liberty interest in abortion, Justice Harlan advocat-
ed strict scrutiny for laws affecting fudamental liberties. See Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (arguing that the "fundamental aspect of qiberty'... re-
quires that [a statute infringing on it] be subjected to 'strict scrutiny.) (Harlan,
J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).
Roe itself squarely places abortion jurisprudence within the right to privacy.
"Liberty" is only one of the sources from which the privacy right deriven:
In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found
at least the roots of [the right to privacy] in the First Amendment; in
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights; in the Ninth Amendment; or in the concept of liberty guaranteed
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
410 U.S. at 152 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
112 S. Ct. at 2818.
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which the state's interest in fetal life becomes compelling."
When the Casey plurality refrained the right to choose
abortion as an interest in liberty, it neglected to hold that this
liberty interest is a fundamental right. Absent classification as
a fundamental right, the right to abortion lost the level of
protection that strict scrutiny affords. Accordingly, the Court
discarded strict scrutiny and selected the "undue burden" stan-
dard to determine the constitutionality of abortion restric-
tions. 5 Under this standard, a law infringing on abortion
rights is considered unconstitutional if it has the "purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion.16 The plurality then defined an obstacle
as substantial if it is "calculated [not] to inform the woman's
free choice, [but to] hinder it." 7 The undue burden standard
is notably less exacting than strict scrutiny, granting the state
more latitude to regulate abortion.
"Id. at 2816. Viability potentially occurs at an earlier stage of pregnancy than
the third trimester. Therefore Casey allows the state to intrude on the abortion
decision sooner than did Roe. In addition to its refraining of Roe and the analysis
of the regulations at issue in Casey, the plurality devoted a large portion of its
opinion to the principle of stare decisis, arguing that Roe had not become unwork-
able and acknowledging that a generation of women had grown up with the expec.
tation that they would have access to abortion should the need arise. Id. at 2808-
16.
' 112 S. Ct. at 2820. This level of scrutiny appears to fall somewhere below
strict scrutiny, but is more rigorous than rational relationship scrutiny. The Casey
dissenters advocated a rational relationship test for abortion regulations. See id. at
2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part),
Id. at 2820.
Id. The clarification of the term "undue burden" as a "substantial obstacle"
is arguably circular, doing little to amplify the meaning of "undue burden" itself.
The undue burden standard has been criticized as vague and unpredictable from
the moment of its inception. Justice Scalia condemns what he sees as the joint
opinion's unsuccessful "efforts at clarification," calling the standard "inherently
manipulable" and "hopelessly unworkable in practice." Id. at 2877. (Scalia, J. con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). He further denounces the
definition of the undue burden for its circularity:
Any regulation of abortion that is intended to advance . . . the State's
"substantial" interest in protecting unborn life will be "calculated [to]
hinder" a decision to have an abortion. It thus seems more accurate to
say that the joint opinion would uphold . . . regulations only if they do
not unduly hinder the woman's decision. That, of course, brings us right
back to square one: Defining an "undue burden" as an "undue hindrance"
(or a "substantial obstacle") hardly "clarifies" the test.
Id. Commentators have criticized the undue burden standard for similar reasons.
See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 59, at 1031 (arguing that undue burden standard
is vague and subjective, and not tailored to meet individual women's needs).
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At issue in Casey were several 1988 and 1989 amendments
to Pennsylania's Abortion Control Act of 1982.' The informed
consent provision of the Act required physicians to explain the
risks of and the alternatives to abortion, the probable gesta-
tional age of the fetus (described as the "unborn child"), and
the medical risks of carrying a child to term. This provision
further requires that a physician or other staff person give
women state-provided written materials. Both the counseling
and the written materials were designed to discourage women
from choosing abortion and to encourage them to choose child-
birth.69 After receiving the biased counseling and the written
materials, the statute required the woman to wait twenty-four
hours before she could obtain an abortion.7 The parental con-
sent provision required a young woman under the age of eigh-
teen to obtain the consent of one parent, or the authorization
of a state court judge, before seeking an abortion!' In addi-
tion, the amendments added several extensive reporting re-
quirements72 and a new definition of medical emergency."
Finally, the statute imposed a spousal notification requirement. 4
1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3203, 3206-09, 3214 (1990).
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205.
70 Id.The statute requires that the written materials: deibe the fetus; explain
that medical benefits may be available for prenatal, childbirth and neonatal care,
and; inform the woman that the father of the fetus is liable to assist in the sup-
port of the child. Id. Finally, this provision describes the penalties for physicians
who do not provide the state-mandated information. Penalties range from misde-
meanor charges to suspension or revocation of the physician's licenze. Id.
71 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214. The mandated reports included, in part-
identification of the physician who performed the abortion; the county and state of
the woman's residence; her age; the number of her prior pregnancies and abor-
tions; the gestational age of the fetus; the type of procedure; the weight of the
aborted fetus, and; whether the abortion was performed on a married woman, and
if so, whether notice to her spouse was given. Id.
718 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203. A medical emergency is defined by the
statute as a:
condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judg-
ment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to
necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death
or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irrevers-
ible impairment of major bodily function.
Id.
." 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3209. This provision prohibited a physician from
performing an abortion on a married woman unless she provided a signed state-
ment indicating that she had notified her spouse that she was planning to have
an abortion. Id, A false statement would be "punishable by law.! Id. The notice
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In applying the undue burden standard to this multitude
of restrictions, the plurality focused on the effect prong of the
undue burden standard: whether the restrictions had the "ef-
fect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion." 5 The plurality's undue burden analysis
was highly fact-based. First, the opinion analyzed each
regulation's measurable effect on access to abortion. Then, the
plurality evaluated the obstacle that the effect imposed.76
The opinion concluded that only the spousal notification
requirement and its corresponding reporting provision had the
requisite impermissible effect of substantially obstructing ac-
cess to abortions and were, therefore, unconstitutional." To
reach this conclusion, the plurality reviewed extensive testimo-
ny presented to the district court as well as independent data
about domestic violence 8 and rejected assertions that the per-
centage of women affected by the provision, an estimated one
percent of all women, was so minimal that the overall burden
could not be undue. 9
Instead, the plurality proclaimed that "the analysis does
was required to "further the Commonwealth's interest in promoting the integrity of
the marriage relationship and to protect a spouse's interests in having children
within marriage .... " Id. Exceptions were allowed if the spouse was not the
father, could not be located, if the pregnancy was the result of spousal sexual
assault, or if the woman had reason to believe that giving notice would be likely
to result in either her spouse or someone else inflicting bodily injury upon her. Id.
7' 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
For example, in analyzing the 24-hour mandatory waiting period, 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1)-(2), the plurality reviewed the district court's find.
ings of the distance a woman had to travel to reach an abortion provider, whether
that woman would have to make at least two trips to the provider, and the in-
creased exposure of women to anti-choice demonstrators. According to the plurality,
the district court's conclusion that the regulation would have a "particularly bur-
densome effect ...on some women" did not necessarily mean that the regulation
was a substantial obstacle for those women it did burden. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2825-26 (emphasis added). Therefore, the plurality found that the regulation, al-
though a particular burden, was not an undue burden. Id. at 2826.
112 S. Ct. at 2830 (invalidating spousal notification provision); id. at 2833
(striking down reporting provision).
"' Data presented by the petitioners and by amici cited by the Court indicate
that domestic violence occurs in two million families in the United States. This
figure was found to be conservative based on the low reporting of domestic vio-
lence crimes. Additionally, the Court cited the factual finding of the district court
that pregnancy itself is often a "flashpoint for battering and violence in the fami-
ly." Id. at 2826-27 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1361
(E.D. Pa. 1990)).
" 112 S Ct. at 2829.
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not end with the one percent upon whom the statute operates;
it begins there."" In other words, the plurality concentrated
its undue burden analysis on "the group for whom the law is a
restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant."1 At
the same time, however, they asserted that a "particularly
burdensome effect.., on some women" did not constitute an
undue burden.82 The semantic distinction appears slight, but
its effect was marked: the joint opinion held that none of the
other restrictions at issue posed an undue burden under the
effect prong.'
Although it extensively analyzed the various effects of the
challenged legislation, the Casey plurality devoted virtually no
attention to analyzing the purpose behind the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act. The plurality eschewed this analysis
despite its assertion that legislation with the "purpose ... of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion" also poses an undue burden and is therefore un-
constitutional.' The plurality neither examined the legisla-
tive history of the Act, nor considered the possible range of
purposes the Act might have.' One conceivable and legiti-
mate purpose for the Act might have been the state's interest
in fetal life. Pennsylvania could have, constitutionally, at-
tempted to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abor-
tion.86 The joint opinion, however, simply presumed that the
Act's purpose was to "inform" or influence a woman's decision
in furtherance of this legitimate interest in fetal life. As a
w Id,
I Id, at 2825-26. (holding that 24-hour mandatory delay is a particular but not
an undue burden).
3 Id, at 2822 (upholding definition of medical emergency); id. at 2822-26 (vali.
dating biased counseling and 24-hour mandatory delay provisions); id. at 2832
(upholding parental consent provision); i/ at 2832-33 (upholding reporting and
recordkeeping requirements).
Id. at 2820 (emphasis added).
See 112 S. Ct 2791.
See 112 S. Ct. at 2821. The Court has long held this intereat to be valid.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973) (holding that the state's interests in
the life and health of the woman and the fetus are valid at different points in a
woman's pregnancy). See also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977) (holding
that Roe "implies no limitation on the authority of a State to mahe a value judg-
ment favoring childbirth over abortion").
8 112 S. Ct. at 2823-24. The plurality followed this presumption even when
the provision had little logical relationship to informing the woman's decision
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consequence of this presumption, and without further investi-
gation, the joint opinion did not invalidate any of the Act's
provisions on the basis that the state's purpose was impermis-
sible.
Subsequent lower court opinions involving challenges to
abortion regulations have made similar presumptions about
legislative purpose and consequently do not analyze the pur-
pose of challenged legislation. Instead, like the Casey plurality,
these courts have devoted their analyses to the effect of abor-
tion legislation on a woman's liberty.' Because the undue
burden standard was only defined recently, the Casey
plurality's highly fact-based, case-specific effect prong analysis
provided the only direction to the litigants and lower courts
grappling with the standard's application.
Yet even these meager clues were limited by the nature of
the undue burden analysis. Because the analysis under the
effect prong is so fact-specific, the same regulation could pose
an undue burden in one state and not in another. As a result,
abortion regulations vary much more widely from state to state
after Casey than under Roe."5 Furthermore, unless a litigant
can predict the harmful effects of a restriction fairly precisely,
women adversely affected by legislation restricting access to
abortion may have to await the implementation of harmful
legislation before challenging it. In addition, challenging legis-
lation that has an indirect effect on the right to choose abor-
tion, such as statutes barring wrongful life and birth claims,
about the abortion procedure. The informed consent provision requires that clinics
or physicians give specific information to a woman regardless of its relevance to
her particular circumstances. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205. For example, wom-
en must be given information about paternal child support. Id.
Assuming arguendo that this information has any relevance to the medical
procedure of abortion, it hardly informs the decision of a woman who either does -
not know the identity of the father of her child, or who would not seek child sup-
port for another reason. The plurality avoids discussion of purpose entirely where
provisions at issue have no relationship whatsoever to the presumed purpose of
informing a woman's decision. Specifically, the joint opinion does not mention the
purpose of the requirement that a doctor provide the information dictated by the
Act, as opposed to another health professional. See 112 S. Ct. at 2824.
See, e.g., Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir.
1994); Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994).
'" See REPRODUCIVE FREEDOM, supra note 50 (comparing abortion restrictions
state by state). For example, Kansas requires an eight-hour delay after the provi-
sion of state-mandated information, while many other states require a 24-hour
delay.
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has become even more difficult under Casey's fact-driven effect
analysis.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRONGFUL BIRTH AND
WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSES OF ACTION
Wrongful life and wrongful birth actions arise when a
physician's negligent care leads to the birth of a child that the
parents"0 might have chosen to abort had they been given ac-
cess to all available information earlier in the pregnancy.9 In
such suits, the physician usually fails to provide the parents
with correct information about or diagnosis of a genetic aberra-
tion or developmental abnormality in the fetus.' Alternative-
ly, a claim may arise when the physician fails to diagnose a
parent's genetic condition properly. In this circumstance, the
physician's act or omission leads to a pregnancy that otherwise
could have been prevented by contraception.'
A wrongful life action is brought by or on behalf of the
child born with congenital anomalies. The child alleges that
but for the negligent diagnosis or the withheld information, he
I Either one parent or both parents can bring these actions. I use the term
"parents" only for simplicity.
91 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1979 & App. 1982). An action
also exists for wrongful conception, which arises when a physician negligently
performs sterilization or negligently provides a contraceptive that leads to the
birth of an unintended child. In addition, although physicians are commonly the
defendants in wrongful life, birth, or conception suits, genetic testing laboratories
have also been subject to suit. See, e.g. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal.
Ritr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980) (genetic testing laboratory sued for negligently failing to
determine that parent was carrier of Tay-Sachs gene); accord Flickinger v.
Wanczyk, 843 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (pharmaceutical company co-defencant
with obstetrician); Troppi v. Scarf; 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. App. 1971) (pharmacist
sued for negligently filling prescription for oral contraceptives).
For criticism of Curlender and wrongful life suits, along with a discussion of
steps a physician should take to avoid liability for any or all of these torts, see
Frank H. Marsh, Prenatal Screening and 'Wrongful Life": Medicinels New 'Catch-
22"?, 143 Am.J. Obs. Gyn. 745 (1982). For a thorough overview of wrongful life
and birth suits, see Thomas D. Rogers, IM, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth.
Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C. L. REV.
713 (1982).
See, eg. Sejpal v. Corson, 637 A.2d 289 (W.D. Pa. 1993), cert denied, 115 S.
Ct. 30 (1994) (physicians negligently failed to give mother result of blood test, or
to perform amniocentesis, after blood test and mother's age indicated a high risk
of Down Syndrome).
' See Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477.
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or she would not have been conceived or would not have been
born.94 The child sues for damages resulting from his or her
birth, including pain and suffering, and for lifetime financial
support. 5 Often, the parents bring a wrongful birth action on
their own behalf in conjunction with the wrongful life action.
They allege that the physician's failure to provide adequate
medical information deprived them of the opportunity to make
a meaningful decision whether to conceive or bear a differently
abled child.96 The parents typically seek damages for expenses
" Wrongful life and birth suits are controversial, not only among pro-life
groups, but among the disabled community as well. These causes of action come
arguably close to promoting eugenics. For an acute analysis of the problems inher-
ent in balancing a woman's right to choose abortion against the rights and inter-
ests of the differently abled community, see Laura Hershey, Choosing Disability,
Ms., July/August 1994 at 26. Additionally, critics of wrongful life suits often cite
the moral conundrum of "measur[ing] the difference between ... life with defects
against the utter void of nonexistence." Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692
(N.J. 1967). See also Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 747 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)
(Robertson, J., concurring) ("Wrongful life actions ask juries to tread where mortals
cannot go, to weigh the cost of life - even handicapped life - against the benefit
of no life at all." ); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y. 2d 401, 386 N.E. 2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (finding that dilemma of whether not being alive is preferable
to life with disability should be left to philosophers and theologians). For an argu-
ment that the moral quagmire of wrongful birth can be avoided by allowing dam-
ages only for medical expenses and not for pain and suffering, see Bonnie
Steinbock, The Logical Case for 'Wrongful Life," HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, April
1986, at 15.
While these moral arguments initially appear persuasive, they are often su-
perficial. These actions only arise after a child is born. Therefore they cannot
encourage women to abort fetuses with disabilities. Instead, wrongful life and birth
actions aim to deter the physician from withholding information from a pregnant
woman about her pregnancy. While some women may terminate the pregnancy of
a fetus which has a genetic disorder, many women will choose to carry to term.
The decision, however, is and should be the woman's.
Moreover, contrary to the common perception and statutory presumption that
women who learn of fetal genetic anomalies will choose abortion, at least one
study supports the inverse proposition. Between 1974 and 1978, researchers asked
297 women who had undergone amniocentesis what they would have done if the
test were not available. While 12.4% of the women surveyed said they would not
have become pregnant at all or would have had an abortion, only 2% of women
studied would have had an abortion had amniocentesis been available. See Letter
to the Editor, The Pro-Life Bonus of Amniocentesis, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 925
(1980). Other commentators have noted that the increased availability of prenatal
testing has led many women who would not have considered having children to
get pregnant. Ruth Hubbard, Legal and Policy Implications of Recent Aduances in
Prenatal Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 201 (1982).
"s See, e.g., Sejpal v. Corson, 637 A.2d 289 (W.D. Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 30 (1994).
96 Id.
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related to the child's condition, including the extraordinary
costs of the child's medical care and special educational
needs.97 The parents may also seek damages for the emotional
distress which they suffer.98
Wrongful life and birth suits have met with varying de-
grees of success. Throughout the 1980's, courts nationwide
began to recognize wrongful birth claims. At least one state
has given the claim statutory recognition." Almost universal-
ly, courts have upheld the validity of wrongful birth claims."'
Wrongful life claims have not fared as well; only four state
courts have recognized this tort.'°
The recognition of wrongful birth and life suits prompted
pro-life organizations to lobby heavily for legislation barring
the claims. °" Influenced, at least in part, by these efforts,
See, ag., Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 116-17 (Pa. 1981) (parents enti-
tled to recover financial expenses for increased cost of rearing child born with
neurofibromatosis).
' Id. But see Becker, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.YS.2ad 895 (1978)
(denying recovery of damages for pain and suffering).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 1990).
' See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981), affd in part,
vacated in part, 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988); Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 638 F.
Supp. 979 (M.D-N.C. 1986) (overridden by interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14.45.1(e) in Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 835)); Andalon v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 899, (Ct. App. 1984); Phillips
v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (ED. Pa. 1978) (overridden by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
8305); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Blake v. Cruz,
698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984) (overridden by IDAHO CODE § 5-334); Goldberg v.
Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530 (IL App. Ct. 1984), affd, 499 N.E.2d 406 (ILl 1986);
Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Smith v. Cote, 513
A.2d 341 (NH. 1986); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 NE.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.,.2d 825 (V.
1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); James G. v.
Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hap., 233 N.W.2d
372 (Wis. 1975).
I See Turpin v. Sortni, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Continental Casualty Co. v.
Empire Casualty Co. 713 P.2d 384 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Procanik v. Cillo, 478
A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
Courts have rejected wrongful life claims on the bases that it is impossible to
compare life with non-existence and damages are therefore incalculable, or because
life cannot be held to be an injury. See supra note 96.
1'2 See, e.g., Hearing on House Bill 1361, "Abortion Control Act' and House Bill
1362, -Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life" Before the Judiciary Comm. of the Penn-
sylvania State House of Representatives, Nov. 12, 1987 [hereinafter Hearing on
House Bill 1361] (testimony of Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation in support of
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twenty-one states introduced legislation to prohibit wrongful
birth or wrongful life actions. °3 Although the majority of
these laws were not enacted, nine states have statutes barring
wrongful birth claims, wrongful life claims, or both.0 4 Only a
handful of cases have challenged the constitutionality of these
statutes, and no majority opinion has held them to be uncon-
stitutional.0 5 In four of the nine states that bar wrongful life
H3.1361 & H.B.1362); id. (testimony of Pennsylvania Catholic Conference in sup-
port of H.B.1361 & HLB.1362); id. (testimony of Dr. Samuel H. Henck in support
of H.B.1361 & H.B.1362). See also Walter M. Weber, Are Wrongful Birth Suits
Unconstitutional?, STATUS CALL (Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights,
WI), Fall 1985, at 2 (objecting that wrongful birth suits force a physician to "be-
come an instrument in the promotion of abortion and the eugenic philosophy");
Thomas P. Monaghan & Larry Morris, Wrongful Life: Another Absurdity, STATUS
CALL, Fall 1982, at 2 (asserting that "the wrongful life ethic is . .. part of the
abortion/infanticide utilitarianism that .. . denigrates individual responsibility and
respect for all human life regardless of condition").
For further discussion of pro-life groups' opposition to these suits, see Note,
Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 2017, 2018 n.6 (1987). The author notes that four pro-life groups filed amicus
briefs in Hickman v. Group Health, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986), the first
case to challenge (unsuccessfully) a statute barring wrongful birth suits. The four
groups were: Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund, The Catholic Health
Association of the United States, The Catholic League for Religious and Civil
Rights, and the National Right to Life Committee, Inc. The Catholic Health Asso-
ciation also proceeded with a public relations campaign, placing advertisements in
national magazines. See, e.g., Rightful or Wrongful Life?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18,
1985, at 89 (paid advertisement by Catholic Health Association).
'0' See Memorandum from Nan Hunter, ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project, to
All ACLU Affiliates and Other Interested Organizations (April 15, 1983) (discuss-
ing state legislation concerning feticide, wrongful birth and wrongful life) (on file
with author).
10, IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (1986) (barring both wrongful life and wrongful birth);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-11 (Burns 1993) (barring wrongful life); MINN. STAT. §
145.424 (1), (2) (1993) (barring wrongful life and wrongful birth, respectively); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 188.130 (1992) (barring both wrongful life and wrongful birth); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14.45.1(e) (1993) (conscience clause used to bar both claims); NJ),
CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (1993) (barring wrongful life); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8305
(1993) (barring both claims); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-55-1 & 21-55-2 (1987)
(wrongful life, birth and conception claims barred); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24
(1993) (both claims barred).
"00 See, e.g., Hickman v. Group Health, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986);
Edmonds v. Western Pa. Hosp. Radiology Assocs., appeal denied, 607 A.2d 1083
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 621 A.2d 580 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 63 (1993).
At least one court has interpreted a conscience clause statute, which allows physi-
cians and nurses to refuse to perform abortions, as indicating legislative leaning
toward disfavor of wrongful life and wrongful birth claims. See Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986) (barring
wrongful life and wrongful birth claims based on conscience clause provision).
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and birth claims, the statutes have never been challenged."'6
While few cases have considered the constitutionality of
the impact that statutes barring wrongful life and wrongful
birth claims have on the right to abortion, those cases that
have justify upholding them on two bases-because the
statute's bar does not affect the right to terminate pregnancy,
or because the statute's effect does not constitute state ac-
tion.'0 7 The issue in all of these cases is whether the statute
infringes the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. A
litigant cannot, however, seek Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tion unless the claim involves state action. The Fourteenth
Amendment protects individuals against action taken by the
states, not against action taken by private parties.' If an
individual has infringed on protected Fourteenth Amendment
rights, the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses provide
The Supreme Court uniformly denied certiorari in these cases. See, eg.,
Edmonds, 607 A.2d at 1083; Azzolino, 337 SE.2d at 528; W'ilzon v. Kuenzi, 751
S.W.2d 741 (Mo.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 893 (1988). Nor has the Court reconsid-
ered the issue since Casey. The Court denied certiorari in a recent challenge
brought under Casey's purpose and effect prongs. See Sejpal v. Coron, 637 A.2d
289 (W.D. Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
1 E.g., Idaho, Indiana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Utah has only one
case arising under its statute. The opinion explicitly states that it does not consid-
er the constitutionality of the statute. Se C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah
1988).
1' See, e.g., Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 10 (finding lack of state action and there-
fore no constitutional violation); Edmonds, 607 A.2d at 1083 (upholding statute
based on lack of state action).
11 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The state "acts" through
its legislative, executive, and judicial bodies. EX pa" e Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347
(1979). Indeed, "But can act in no other way." Id. Therefore, when a state legisla-
ture enacts legislation, the legislative branch of the state ads. See Henry C.
Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 587, 597 (1991) (legislation is a fundamental form of state action). See
also LAURENCE 11 TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688 (2d ed. 1988) (If
litigants challenge validity of state statute, "state action is obvious, and no formal
inquiry into the matter is needed.").
Additionally, when a state court enforces a law that allegedly infringes on
constitutional rights, that enforcement constitutes state action. See New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (stating that state court's applica-
tion of common law defamation and privacy rules constitutes state action). The
Supreme Court also has held that state court enforcement of a private covenant
can rise to the level of state action. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1947)
(finding that state court enforcement of private, racially discriminatory covenant
involving property is "action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment."). Sheley, however, has been subject to criticism from both courts and
commentators. See TRIBE, supra note 109, at 1711-12, 1714-15.
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redress only in limited circumstances." 9 In these circum-
stances, the state normally has no responsibility unless it has
encouraged the behavior or exercised coercive power sufficient
to render the act essentially an act of the state."'
Courts that have rejected challenges to statutes barring
wrongful life and wrongful birth suits based on a lack of state
action have reasoned that private physicians, and not the
state, are the actors in the wrongful life or birth scenario."'
Under this view, the physician who gives an incorrect diagno-
sis or deliberately omits to give the woman results of a prena-
tal test is responsible for any resulting damage-not the
state.1 2 Courts that subscribe to this view hold that these
statutes merely bar a cause of action for damages against the
physician, but do not direct the physician to act or fail to act in
any way. 3 Courts also have rejected the argument that by
removing physician liability, the statutes encourage physicians
to withhold information."4 Overall, these courts treat these
"' See TRIBE, supra note 108, at 1688-91 (court must determine if government
acquiescence or inaction could be considered tacit ratification of a private act or
delegation of a public responsibility to a private party). Fourteenth Amendment
protections also apply when a governmental agent-whether executive, judicial or
legislative-acts under color of state law. Id. at 1703-05.
110 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982) (ruling that private action
which "sufficiently receive[s] the imprimatur of the [s]tate" can be attributed to
the state itself). The Supreme Court has held that determining whether state
action exists is a complex process that requires a court to look at individual facts
and circumstances to differentiate between private and state acts. See Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
722 (1961).
"I See, e.g., Hickman v. Group Health, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1986)
(finding the "relationship . . . is strictly between doctor and patient). But see id,
at 18-19 (Amdahl, C.J., dissenting) (finding that the deprivation of information pro.
tected by a statute barring wrongful life carries the imprint of the state).
u2 Id. at 13.
1 See id. ("The statute does not forbid the doctor to inform the patient of new
tests and the risk they entail.") For criticism of the court's constitutional analysis
in Hickman, see Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Cur.
tailment, supra note 102.
1M Edmonds v. Western Pa. Hosp. Radiology Assocs., 607 A.2d 1083, 1088 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 621 A.2d 580 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
63 (1993). The Edmonds court found this argument to be too speculative, asserting
that the statute encourages neither "intentional misrepresentations [n]or the negli-
gent impartation of information relating to abortion rights". The court went on to
note that speculation alone cannot overcome the presumption of constitutionality
afforded to statutory provisions but failed to recognize that deterrence is a central
purpose of virtually all tort liability. For criticism of the court's treatment of state
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statutes as mere tort reform.
Courts that have surpassed the threshold state action
issue to consider the merits of challenges to statutes barring
wrongful life and birth claims have held that the statutes do
not affect abortion rights."5 These cases-almost all of which
were decided prior to Casey-use the analysis developed in
Roe."6 They interpret Roe to govern only legislation that di-
rectly impacts on abortion rights and therefore reject challeng-
es to statutes barring wrongful life and birth claims because
such statutes do not regulate or affect abortion directly."1
Analysis of these statutes under the undue burden test devel-
oped in Casey, however, yields a significantly different result.
HI. AN ANALYSIS OF WRONGFUL LIFE AND BIRTH STATUTES
UNDER CASEY: PURPOSE AND EFFECT
A. The Importance of the Purpose Prong
While Planned Parenthood v. Casey restricted the right to
abortion by permitting broader state regulation of the proce-
dure, Casey's purpose prong generated a new, independent
basis to challenge legislation that impinges on the right to
choose abortion. Courts have continued to ignore the purpose
prong, however, perhaps because the plurality in Casey did not
perform a purpose analysis of the Abortion Control Act. This
oversight notwithstanding, a purpose test for legislation that
affects abortion rights is important in several respects.
First, purpose prong analysis is distinct from the extensive
fact-based, effect prong analysis applied by the Supreme Court
and lower courts post-Casey."' Under the effect prong, be-
action in Edmonds, see Adam M. Silverman, Comment, Pcnylvanids Wrongful
Birth Statutes Impact on Abortion Rights: State Action and Undue Burden, 66
TEMP. L. REV. 1087 (1993).
u6 See, e.g. Hiwkman, 396 N.W.2d at 10; Edmonds, 607 A.2d at 1083.
n6 The most recent case to address the merits of the constitutional challenge
was Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816 (Pa. Super. 1993). The
Dan by court relied almost exclusively on Edmonds, which itself relied on a pre-
Casey analysis. See id. at 819. The decision does not cite Cacey. Id.
U7 See, e.g., Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14 (stating that statute barring wrongful
birth suit "does not directly interfere with the woman's right to choose a safe
abortion"); Edmonds, 607 A.2d at 1087 (concluding that statute "neither regulates
nor directly affects [abortion] rights").
" See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text for discussion of the effect
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cause only a substantial obstacle constitutes an undue burden,
the court must ascertain not only whether an obstacle exists,
but the "size" of the obstacle. The "effect" of a restriction must
be calculable. Furthermore, courts must distinguish between a
particular burden and an undue burden; only an undue burden
is unconstitutional." 9
This calculation becomes increasingly difficult if the chal-
lenged law is not an abortion regulation, but still affects the
right to choose abortion indirectly. Statutes that bar wrongful
life and birth claims fall in this category. The "effect" of such
an indirect regulation of abortion can be either difficult to
measure, or too conflated with other factors to satisfy a Casey
effect prong analysis. 2 ' Moreover, effect prong analysis relies
on highly case-specific factors; the outcome of the analysis may
vary from state to state.' A virtually identical restriction
might pose a substantial obstacle in one state and not in an-
other."2  These shifting, case-specific considerations, the
vagueness of the term "substantial" and the difficulty of accu-
rately measuring the effect of abortion restrictions make the
effect prong of Casey unpredictable, difficult to prove, and
highly prone to result-oriented judicial decision-making."2 In
contrast, purpose prong analysis avoids this quagmire because
it does not rely on such immeasurable, case-specific, and ma-
nipulable factors.
Additionally, litigants can challenge legislation under the
purpose prong immediately. To argue successfully under the
effect prong, a woman must suffer harm or be able to predict it
with some specificity. In some instances, a woman will not
have standing to challenge legislation that will have a harmful
effect on her until after the harm has occurred. Moreover,
should a woman have standing, the facts necessary to satisfy
prong of Casey.
u" See 112 S. Ct. at 2825-26.
12 See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
2 Possible factors include the number of abortion facilities in a state, the ac-
cessibility of public transportation, and the cost of the procedure.
12 See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
See Benshoof, supra note 50, at 2252. "The 'undue burden' standard is also
sufficiently vague to permit judges to interpret state statutes in an arbitrary fash-
ion .... [Clourts now have broad discretion to decide when the imposition of a
law amounts to an 'undue burden'." Id. The author refers to challenges brought
under the effect prong.
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Casey's substantiality requirement may be virtually impossible
to prove before the challenged legislation goes into effect.
Purpose-based challenges, however, do not require a litigant to
prove or predict harm.
Furthermore, inasmuch as legislators do not pass laws
arbitrarily but with a desired end in mind, a finding of imper-
missible purpose can buttress a litigant's efforts to prove the
unconstitutional effect of an abortion regulation.24 When a
competent legislature intends to place a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion, one can presume
that the resulting legislation will successfully effectuate that
end.' A finding of unconstitutional legislative purpose,
while not dispositive, may be indicative of that legislation's un-
constitutional effect.
Finally, analysis of the legislative purpose of a statute
resolves the state action problem that can arise under an effect
analysis. On its face, a statute may regulate only the interac-
tion between private individuals. The legislature may have an
entirely different legislative purpose, however. When the state
intends for a statute to have an impermissible impact on con-
stitutionally protected rights, the statute no longer regulates
individual conduct alone. While the conduit for the state's act
may be a private individual-such as the physician in a wrong-
"' Ironically, under equal protection analysis, the inverse is true: purpose is
dispositive and effect is only evidence of purpose. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (rejecting the argument that disparate impact alone is viola-
tive of the equal protection clause and finding discriminatory legislative purpose
necessary for equal protection violation.) See infra notes 156-57 and acompanying
text.
' One commentator points out that purpose analysis would be redundant if
only used to examine laws that already have an impermissible effect under Casey
- laws that place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abor-
tion. See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Bole of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 883 n.53 (1994). He
comments, 'The only circumstance in which a purpose inquiry would be useful
would be when a state law was intended to create a substantial obstacle to wom-
en seeking abortions, but somehow failed to further this objective." Id. The author
does not view purpose as an independent inquiry, however. See id. Brownstein
overlooks, however, that the undue burden standard becomes particularly difficult
to meet when a law has an indirect effect on the right to choose abortion, such as
in the case of statutes barring wrongful life and birth actions. These statutes
achieve the unstated purpose of preventing women from obtaining abortions, while
that same effect can be difficult to prove under Casey's fact-centered analysis. See
infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
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ful life or birth suit-if the state intends for that individual to
violate another's constitutional rights, it is as if the state itself
has acted. Passage and enforcement of such a statute therefore
constitutes state action. In the case of statutes barring wrong-
fiul birth and life suits, an analysis of those statutes' purpose is
essential to overcoming the state action problem.
B. Analysis of Wrongful Birth and Life Statutes Under Casey's
Effect Prong
As discussed above, in Casey, the Supreme Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty encompasses a
woman's right to choose abortion.' The Fourteenth Amend-
ment only protects a woman's right to liberty, however, against
state infringement.'27 Therefore, to challenge a wrongful life
or birth statute successfully, a litigant first must show that
these statutes involve actions of the state, and not merely
those of private individuals such as physicians.
Next, assuming that the passage or enforcement of these
statutes implicates an act of the state, a litigant must show
that the state's act violates his or her constitutionally protect-
ed rights. The liberty right that Casey carves out is not abso-
lute: the state can regulate abortion to protect its interest in
fetal life, and to maintain acceptable medical standards.1"
An acceptable regulation becomes an impermissible infringe-
ment on a woman's right to liberty only when it has the "effect
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek-
ing an abortion."" 9 Therefore, statutes that bar wrongful
birth or life suits must have the effect of substantially ob-
structing a woman from obtaining an abortion in order to be
invalid under the effect prong of Casey.
Contrary to the conclusions of some courts, 3 ' statutes
barring wrongful life and wrongful birth actions do constitute
such state action. Wrongful life and wrongful birth claims are
tort claims. A basic tenet of tort law is that liability deters
,26 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
'T See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text for general discussion of
state action.
'2 Id. at 2817.
12 Id. at 2820.
120 See supra notes 108, 112-14 and accompanying text.
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behavior society wants to discourage.' Both compensatory
and punitive damages aim, to varying degrees, to dissuade the
tortfeasor from repeating undesirable behavior, and to deter
others from similar action.'" The risk of medical malpractice
actions, therefore, functions as a deterrent to poor medical
practices."i3
By shielding physicians from liability, statutes that bar
wrongful life and birth claims remove a valuable tool for deter-
ring physicians from withholding medically relevant informa-
tion from women. 34 By removing this deterrent, the state
substantially and sufficiently encourages physicians to violate
womei's liberty interest in abortion by permitting them to do
so with impunity. Because the state encourages the physician's
behavior, the violation of her liberty right carries the "impri-
matur of the state" and can be attributed to the state it-
self."s Therefore, Fourteenth Amendment protections ap-
ply. 13
6
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1979) (tort damages punish
wrongdoers and deter others from similar wrongful acts); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6-7 (5th ed. 1984).
1 KEETON ET AL., supra note 131, at 9-10 (punitive damages diccourage partic-
ularly egregious conduct);, id. at 25 (compensatory damages reduce the occurrence
of undesirable behavior).
3 See Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical
Malpractice: Thoughts about the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 939, 966-68 (1984) (finding that the threat of wrongful birth and other mal-
practice liability changes physician behavior and reduces the risk of patient inju-
ry); see also Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 19S1) (finding
that denial of wrongful birth cause of action would immunize physicians who pro-
vide inadequate guidance to women "who would choose to exercise their constitu-
tional right to abort fetuses, which, if born, would suffer from genetic... do-
fects") (quoting Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979)).
"' See Troppi v. Scarf; 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). In determining
whether a wrongful life or birth claim can be brought against a pharmacist who
dispenses contraceptives inaccurately, the court held that "[t]o absolve defendant of
all liability here would be to remove one deterrent against the negligent dispens-
ing of [contraceptives]." Id at 517. For a discussion of why administrative sanc-
tions are not as effective a deterrent as tort damages, ree Silverman, cupra note
116, at 1101-02.
1' See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982). See also Hichman v.
Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 19 (Mlnn. 1986) (Amdahl, C., disrant-
ing) ("While, facially, it is the doctor's conduct which deprives the woman of the
information she needs to make an informed decision, the deprivation of the infor-
mation carries with it the imprint of the state.).
"' Furthermore, the state's actual purpose in passing these statutes is to ob-
struct a woman who might seek an abortion once she has learned that she is
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Under Casey's effect prong, statutes that bar wrongful life
and birth must pose a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking
an abortion to violate a woman's Fourteenth Amendment liber-
ty interest in choosing abortion. As noted above, wrongful life
and birth statutes do not regulate abortion directly, but have
the indirect effect of enabling a physician, with impunity, to
misrepresent or withhold critical information about a fetus'
health from a pregnant woman. 7 The Casey plurality re-
peatedly emphasized that informed choice is central to a
woman's right to abortion, and encouraged states to pass legis-
lation "aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and in-
formed."13 Moreover, Casey stressed the centrality of the doc-
tor-patient relationship for creating the necessary forum for
informed consent."9 The Court stressed that the state-man-
dated information provided by physicians must be "truthful
carrying a fetus with abnormalities. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
The state's purpose is not merely to affect the relationship between private parties
but to impact on a federally protected right. This purpose constitutes state action.
See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
" The physicians who are most likely to be encouraged are precisely those who
already object to abortion. These statutes enable them to withhold information
with no liability.
8 112 S. Ct. at 2824. The Casey plurality consistently argues that women be
given more information, not less. For example, the plurality finds that state re-
quirements that physicians provide information about the gestational age and
consequences to the fetus are valid, "even when those consequences have no direct
relation to [the woman's] health." Id. at 2823. With any medical procedure, physi.
cians must adhere to the doctrine of informed consent: the duty to inform patients
with information about all treatment options. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) ("Duty to dis-
close is more than a call to speak merely on the patient's request, or merely to
answer the patient's questions; it is duty to volunteer ... the information the
patient needs for an intelligent decision.").
Prior to Casey, the Supreme Court consistently emphasized both the impor-
tance of the principle that physicians provide accurate, nonmisleading information
to women seeking abortions, and the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship.
See Akron v. Akron Reprod. Ctr. for Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983) (Akron
1) (invalidating an ordinance which mandated a "litany of information the physi-
cian must recite" regardless of its relevance to a the woman's pregnancy); see also
Thornburgh v. American College of Obs. and Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (emphasiz-
ing that an unimpeded relationship between a woman and her physician protects
a woman's informed choice). To the extent that Casey overruled prior case law and
upheld state-mandated information requirements, the plurality perceived these
requirements as "a reasonable means to insure that the woman's consent is in-
formed." 112 S. Ct. at 2824-25.
" See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823-25 (discussing the importance of the
physician's role in the informed consent of the patient).
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and not misleading"40 as well as "calculated to inform the
woman's free choice, not hinder it."'
A physician's failure to disclose accurate information about
fetal health to a pregnant woman is as misleading as providing
false information.42 When a physician withholds information
with the intent to prevent a woman from seeking an abortion,
that omission certainly is calculated to hinder the woman's
free choice. By encouraging this behavior on the part of physi-
cians, statutes barring wrongful life and wrongful birth actions
absolutely contradict the principles of informed consent es-
poused in Casey. " 3 Moreover, the particular information
withheld-the health of the fetus-is so integral to informed
choice that its omission substantially obstructs a woman s
right to choose abortion.'" By posing such an obstacle, stat-
utes barring wrongful life and birth claims unduly burden a
woman's right to choose abortion and are unconstitutional.
Litigants who challenge these statutes, however, face the
formidable task of proving that the statutes are not mere in-
consequential hindrances, but that their effect is indeed sub-
stantial. Under Casey, the effect inquiry focuses on the group
10 Id. at 2823.
'* Id, at 2820.
' The state cannot "prejudice a woman's choice ... by limiting the informa-
tion available to her:' Id. at 2841 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)). See also Patricia Dono-
van, Wrongful Birth and Wrongfid Conception: The Legal and Moral Iosues, FA R.
PLANNING PERSP., larch/April 1984, at 64.
Laws barring wrongful-birth claims not only undercut an important legal
trend, they are also contrary to the widely held legal view that patients
have a right to complete information about the nature and foreseeable
risks of any proposed medical treatment, so they can make informed
choices about how to proceed. Such laws, in effect, sanction the withheld-
ing of information that most prospective parents would consider crucial to
have before deciding whether to proceed with a pregnancy.
Id. at 65, 67.
1 See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
144 A particularly narrow reading of Casey might dictate that providing accurate,
nonmisleading information is only required in circumstances where a woman actu-
ally seeks an abortion. A woman barred from bringing a wrongful life or birth
action commonly seeks general reproductive health care at the point when her
physician withholds information from her. This seeming distinction does not pres-
ent a problem, however - the joint opinion makes clear that a pregnant woman
needs all relevant information no matter what her final choice may be. See Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2824. See also supra note 142 (discussing importance of informed
consent).
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that the restriction actually affects, not those "for whom the
law is irrelevant."'45 In wrongful life and wrongful birth cas-
es, the statutes most significantly affect women who would
have terminated their pregnancies had they been aware of the
information withheld by their physicians.
Although it seems clear that these statutes obstruct access
to abortion for this particular group of women, Casey demands
a highly detailed factual showing to prove substantiality.146
Gathering the requisite evidence in these circumstances is
difficult for several reasons. First, courts are likely to demand
that a litigant establish that the affected group of women abso-
lutely would have chosen to terminate their pregnancies had
they known of the fetal defect. If the affected women might
have carried the fetus to term, courts are likely to view the
information withheld as not substantial, or perhaps as no
obstacle at all. Moreover, although it is a question of fact, the
average woman probably cannot predict accurately her reaction
to the knowledge that she carries a child with mental or physi-
cal anomalies. Courts are apt to view women's speculations as
unreliable.
Similarly, showing that the affected group chose not to
abort based solely on physician omission presents equally
thorny problems. The decision to abort is uncomplicated for
many women, but not for all. For some women, the choice
between carrying to term and terminating a pregnancy is de-
pendant on a combination of many factors: her health, her
financial resources, her desire to have a child, her relationship
status, if any, and the timing of the pregnancy. Health of the
fetus is only one, albeit a highly significant, factor. A court is
unlikely to be inclined toward or capable of parsing out the
omitted information's effect from the effect of other factors.
Furthermore, a litigant may have to prove that the
statute's shield from liability motivated her physician to with-
hold or misrepresent the relevant information. This inquiry
presents analogous difficulties. Was the statute a motivating
factor for or merely incidental to the physician's act? Under
14 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
146 In Casey, after extensive fact-finding the Court found facts sufficient to
strike down only the spousal notification provision of Pennsylvania's Abortion Con-
trol Act. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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Casey proving substantial obstruction of the group most direct-
ly affected by these statutes-pregnant woman who would
have aborted had they known the infornation that their physi-
cians withheld as a result of the statute-may be exceedingly
difficult. Under Casey, in short, litigants may be unable to
prove that statutes barring claims for wrongful life and wrong-
ful birth are unconstitutional.
C. Analysis of Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Statutes
Under Casey's Purpose Prong
Under the purpose prong of Casey, a challenge to wrongful
life and birth statutes may be successful. As noted above,
Casey forbids legislation that has the "purpose... of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abor-
tion."'47 Legislation with this purpose violates a woman's
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in abortion.' In the
abortion context, specific legislative purposes are presumptive-
ly valid: for example, the state can attempt to discourage wom-
en from seeking abortions to further its interest in potential
life.' When the state's purpose surpasses mere encourage-
ment and reaches the intent to substantially obstruct a
woman's abortion decision, the legislation becomes unconstitu-
147 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
' Courts frequently consider the legislative purpose of laws impacting on indi-
vidual rights, for example, when considering an equal protection challenge. Equal
protection analysis requires inquiry into the purposes of legislation that classifies
on the basis of race or gender, among other factors. 'Discriminatory purpose' . . .
implies that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group." Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79
(1979).
A court will not invalidate legislation involving a suspect or quasi-suspect
class on equal protection grounds if impermissible purpose is not proven. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially dis-
criminatory purpose"). The proof of this discriminatory intent usually must rely on
objective factors, some of which the Supreme Court delineated in Arlington Hts. v.
Metropolitan Housing. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). These factors include the
historical background, "if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious
purposes," the legislative or administrative history, including "contemporary tate-
ments by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or re-
ports" and possibly testimony from legislators, and, on occasion, evidence of dis-
parate impact. Id. at 266-269.
I' See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
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tional under Casey. Close examination of the purpose of legis-
lation affecting abortion rights is necessary to distinguish
permissible from impermissible state goals.
Legislation barring wrongful life and birth claims has the
explicit, permissible purpose of barring a cause of action
against physicians-standard tort reform. The underlying
purpose of this legislation, however, is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. Because
the legislature intends to infringe on a constitutionally pro-
tected right, and not to affect the relationship between private
individuals, this legislative purpose automatically constitutes
state action. The legislative history of Pennsylvania's wrongful
birth and life statute,15 Title 42, section 8305 of the Pennsyl-
vania Consolidated Statutes Annotated ("section 8305"), both
exposes and exemplifies this impermissible legislative intent.
Pennsylvania passed section 8305 in 1988, four years be-
fore the Supreme Court decided Casey. Prior to its enactment,
Pennsylvania had recognized wrongful birth claims.'51 In
1984, the state had attempted to pass Senate Bill 750, a piece
of legislation almost identical to section 8305.152 The Pennsyl-
vania House sponsor of the 1984 bill, Representative Stephen
Freind,"5 ' described the bill as barring, inter alia, lawsuits in
which a parent claims a physician should have "suggested a
test which would have made the woman decide to have an
abortion."154 In urging passage of the bill, Representative
Freind asked his fellow legislators to "come down on the side of
life."15
5
150 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (1988).
See Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1984).
112 S.B. 750, 168th Leg., 1984 Pa. Laws. One difference between the 1984 ver-
sion and 1987 version in effect now as § 8305 is that the wrongful birth provision
of S.B. 750 specifically bars claims alleging that "a person . . . once conceived ...
would or should have been aborted." Id. (emphasis added). Section 8305 currently
bars claims that "a person once conceived would not or should not have been
born." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (emphasis added).
" Representative Freind was also a sponsor of the Pennsylvania Abortion Con-
trol Act at issue in Casey.
" Pa. House Leg. J. 1509 (June 20, 1984). Representative Freind presumed
that all women who learn that their fetuses have health problems will automati-
cally abort. Furthermore, he did not consider fetal anomalies that can be cured by
intrauterine intervention.
11 Id. at 1510. Other pro-life legislators supported the bill on similar grounds.
See id. at 1516 (statement of Representative Paul Clymer) ("[W]e put a high pro-
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Opponents of the proposed bill objected to freeing physi-
cians from the duty to provide pregnant women with vital
medical information.'56 Then-Governor Thornburgh, a pro-life
advocate who had signed the Pennsylvania Abortion Control
Act into law, vetoed this bill, declaring that it violated princi-
ples of informed consent.'51 In his veto message, he stated
that "the Supreme Court... has clearly held that a woman
has a constitutional right to an abortion.... Under these cir-
cumstances, the intelligent exercise of that right should not be
made to depend on the competence, diligence, integrity or
philosophical views of a particular attending physician."'
Wrongful life and wrongful birth bills resurfaced in both
the Pennsylvania House and Senate three years later, in tan-
dem with the amendments to the Abortion Control Act that
would be at issue in Casey.159 The legislative history of these
bills further demonstrates the Pennsylvania General
Assembly's intention of substantially obstructing women from
seeking abortions.' Furthermore, this history shows that
section 8305 is calculated to hinder and not to inform a
woman's choice, a legislative action Casey proscribes.' 6 '
In support of the House version, Representative Freind
testified that "until Roe... is reversed, those in the pro-life
movement must be as aggressive and creative as possible in
drafting and passing legislation which regulates and restricts
abortion as much as possible."'" Representative Freind em-
phasized that the legislation was designed to protect those pro-
mium ... on human life, and this amendment that we are debating here this
afternoon is one in which we are emphasizing again as a body of lawmahers that
we indeed value human life.").
" See id. at 1513 (statement of Representative Lois Sherman Hagarty). Repre-
sentative Hagarty pointed out the irony that "perhaps 2 years ago we stood here
and listened to Representative Freind argue about informed consent for women.
He wanted women to have informed consent before they made choices, and yet
today he stands before this General Assembly and he says that women should not
be informed of the availability of certain tests." Id.
' Pa. Senate Leg. J. 2674 (Sept. 17, 1984) (veto message of Governor Richard
Thornburgh dated July 3, 1984).
usId-
,' House Bill 1362 and Senate Bill 646. The amendments to the Abortion Con-
trol Act were embodied in House Bill 1361.
" The Senate version passed both chambers and is now codified as section
8305.
* 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
z Hearing on H.B. 1361, supra note 104 (testimony of Representative Freind).
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life physicians who would refuse to perform amniocentesis if
they believed it would influence a woman's decision whether to
carry to term or to abort. 6 3 One such pro-life physician, testi-
fying to the same committee, urged passage of the House bill
to protect physicians, who, like himself, would not "order tests
and studies on a pregnant woman, the sole purpose of which is
to destroy the unborn child. ' 4 This physician further testi-
fied that he would not participate in treatment that could
possibly result in abortion.161 This testimony amply shows
that the bills sponsors did not have tort reform in mind, but
fully intended for the bill to obstruct women's right to abortion.
In House debate, Representative Freind argued that
wrongful life and birth suits force physicians to recommend
eugenic abortions. 166 He consistently reiterated that even if a
physician intentionally and knowingly lied to a woman about
the health of her fetus, under the proposed legislation, the
woman would not have a cause of action for infringement of
her right to abortion. 67 Furthermore, he argued that "no
law... requires a doctor on any treatment for any condition to
fully disclose the information to the patient."16  Regardless of
the veracity of such statements pre-Casey, Casey clearly dic-
tates that the information physicians provide to pregnant
women about their options be "truthful and not
13 "Frequently, these suits have been successful and have resulted in the doctor
being required to pay ... damages.... An example of this would be a Pro-life
doctor who, because of his belief, refuses to recommend amniocentesis on the basis
that the only result would be for the woman to decide whether or not to have an
abortion." Memorandum from Stephen F. Freind to the Members of the Pennsylva-
nia House of Representatives (Nov. 10, 1987).
" Hearing on H.B. 1361, supra note 104 (statement of Dr. Samuel H. Henck,
family practitioner).
166 Id. In House debate, an opponent of the bill pointed to this physician's testi-
mony as particularly disturbing, and urged the House not to "meet the
[physician's] requests" by passing the bill because "[i]t is wrong, fundamentally
wrong, that we allow a physician to intrude his beliefs or her beliefs . . . however
much they may be shared by people on the floor of [the] House, and substitute
those beliefs for the beliefs and the human judgment of the parents of the child."
Pa. House Leg. J. 311 (Feb. 24, 1988) (statement of Representative David W.
Heckler).
166 Pa. House Leg. J. 306 (Feb. 24, 1988), 1988 Pa. Legis. Serv. 303, 306
(Purdon).
'6' See, e.g., Pa. House Leg. J. 310, 314.
168 Id. at 313.
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misleading."'69 Supporters of the bill bluntly advocate viola-
tions of that principle.
Supporters of the Senate bill made similar arguments to
those of its House proponents. Senator Joseph Rocks, the bill's
sponsor in the Senate, for example, defined the legislature's
objective in barring wrongful life and birth claims as prevent-
ing physicians from being "coerced into accepting eugenic abor-
tion as a condition for avoiding [a lawsuit]." 7 ' Another propo-
nent saw the function of a statute barring wrongful life and
birth suits as "a simple question [of] whether [the legislature]
should or should not save the life- of an unborn child."
Opponents of both the House and Senate bills expressed
grave concern about the detrimental effect of such legislation
on a woman's informed consent. As noted above, Casey stresses
the importance of the relationship between full and complete
information and a woman's choice of whether or not to
abort." Senator Greenwood criticized the bill, stating:
[Ilt is ironic that the proponents of this legislation, who have argued
so relentlessly about the need for informed consent for those who
would have an abortion, who have argued that any woman who is
about to have an abortion must be told every last detail about the
risks of the abortion, about the details of the abortion, about the
possible complications of an abortion, that same woman should be
kept in the dark... and not given informed consent about some of
the medical tools available to her in her pregnancy. The way this
bill does that is by providing immunity from wrongful birth suits for
physicians who withhold that information.'"
Similarly, Senator Lewis argued that the purpose of the law
was to promote the impermissible objective of denying women
information about their pregnancies. 4 In the House, Repre-
sentative Heckler criticized the bill for destroying the relation-
ship between a woman and her doctor by allowing the doctor to
deceive her based on the doctor's own philosophical beliefs.' "
The Casey decision echoes these legislators' concerns by em-
phasizing the sanctity and importance of the doctor-patient
iCO 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
170 Pa. Senate Leg. J. 1961 (Iar. 22, 1988).
,7 Id, at 1963 (statement of Senator Clarence Bell).
7 See supra note 161.
SId, at 1960 statement of Senator James C. Greenwooi.
174 Id, at 1962 statement of Senator Craig Levis.
170 Pa. House Leg. J. 311.
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relationship to informed choice. 6
This legislative history demonstrates that the legislative
purpose of section 8305 is to substantially obstruct women
from seeking abortions. This purpose is prohibited under the
purpose prong of Casey. The proponents of section 8305 aim to
reduce the number of abortions by allowing physicians to with-
hold information that might lead women to abort their fetuses.
Because Casey insists that women be given accurate,
nonmisleading information about their pregnancies, and be-
cause these statutes have the purpose of encouraging physi-
cians to mislead women, they violate a woman's Fourteenth
Amendment right to liberty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although a woman's right to choose abortion was upheld
in Casey, the undue burden standard of review protects abor-
tion rights far less effectively than its predecessor, the strict
scrutiny standard. Concomitant with this lowered standard is
the heightened factual showing Casey requires. These com-
bined factors permit significantly greater state restriction of
abortion than was possible under the doctrine of Roe.
The emergence of statutes barring wrongful life and
wrongful birth suits is one example of how opponents of re-
productive freedom have capitalized on this increased judicial
tolerance of hostility to abortion rights. These statutes are
cleverly disguised attacks on women's right to choose abortion,
couched in the guise of increasingly popular tort reform. Advo-
cates of statutes barring wrongful life and birth suits seek to
put a woman's constitutionally protected liberty interest in her
physician's control. They do so with total disregard for the law
as expressed in Casey, and with a careless disregard for the
lives and health of women and their children.
Pro-choice advocates must be vigilant and innovative in
their defense of a woman's right to choose abortion. The pur-
pose prong of Casey is one positive development in a legislative
and judicial climate in which protection of women's reproduc-
tive freedom has been substantially eroded. Challenges to
statutes that impact on abortion rights, including statutes that
176 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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bar wrongful life and birth claims, should capitalize on this de-
velopment and expose the legislative history and any other
factor that illuminates a statute's impermissible purpose. In
addition, courts must begin to acknowledge and use the pur-
pose prong. In the effort to protect and preserve reproductive
choice, the purpose prong of Planned Parenthood v. Casey
should not be overlooked.
Julie F. KowitzI17
"' The author wishes to thank Simon Heller of the Center for Reproductive
Law & Policy for his assistance with this Note.
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